What is described as a "growing" number of ex-military critics has been joined by Major-General John Batiste, a military commander in Iraq and former aide to Paul Wolfowitz.

The ranks of Rumsfeld's critics were joined Wednesday by retired Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste, who served as a division commander in Iraq and was a military aide to former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, a primary architect of the Iraq invasion.

Batiste said he believed Rumsfeld should resign, arguing that the Pentagon needed a new leader who could work with top officers "without intimidation."

In an interview, Batiste said negative feelings about Rumsfeld were widespread among generals he served with. He added that there was an almost universal belief that the secretary did not treat military leaders and their opinions with respect.

"It speaks volumes about the leadership climate within the Pentagon," Batiste said. "Civilian control is absolutely paramount, but in order for it to work, there is a two-way street of respect and dialogue that has to exist."

What? No criticism of the war in Iraq, just a concern that some generals may have had their feelings hurt?

At least Gregory Neubold parroted the left-wing talking points while incidentally blaming the Jews for all the problems in the middle-east.

These gentlemen join Paul D. Eaton, who wrote a critical editorial in the New York Times (where else?) and of course Anthony Zinni, who has been a standing critic of the war from the outset.

In reading their critiques, one thing becomes very clear--these are very political guys. Consider Eaton's view of Shinseki's alleged disrespectful treatment.

Only Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff when President Bush was elected, had the courage to challenge the downsizing plans. So Mr. Rumsfeld retaliated by naming General Shinseki's successor more than a year before his scheduled retirement, effectively undercutting his authority. The rest of the senior brass got the message, and nobody has complained since.

Who is Eaton criticizing here? Rumsfeld, for doing what any good manager would do--get rid of the personnel obstacles to the program, or the generals for valuing their careers more than then mission? Of course, this is simply Eaton's view of things, perhaps even sour grapes that his views found so little support among his colleagues. The irony of his comment is that if its as he says, Rumsfeld is the solution and the generals are the problem.

If the officer cadre are all a bunch of careerists rather than warriors, then its quite obvious to me that a little--no a lot, of butt-kicking is required.

Batiste's move over into the critics corner is particularly surprising because few officers would have had more opportunity to make their opinions known that he did, being as he was, directly involved with the war planning.

As the LA Times article points out, Shinseki is a touch stone for all of these dissident generals, and what it all really comes down to is the Powell doctrine, which was very good for the post-Vietnam military, but wasn't particularly good for the country and was made even more irrelevant in the post-9/11 world. The Powell doctrine was all about repairing a "broken" military, and it was an effective and necessary doctrine in its time. But a repaired military isn't a classic car in a dust-controlled garage--its a tool of foreign policy and the Powell doctrine had to be retired at some point.

Would we even be having this discussion if the Powell doctrine hadn't dictated that we let Iraq off the hook in the first Gulf war? Not much gets said about that.

The reality is that Rumsfeld is faced with a wholesale reform of the military and its missions and that will undoubtedly play havoc with the sensibilities of the old guard. So be it.

In my view, and I am only reading between the lines, the resignations and criticism is a sign of one of two things, or perhaps both similutaneously--the search for scapegoats for a mission expected to go badly, or a sign that Rumsfeld is winning the battle for reform. Some others seem to agree.

Andrew J. Bacevich, a professor of international relations at Boston University and a Vietnam veteran, said he believed it was unprecedented for retired senior officers who had so recently served during a war to criticize civilian leaders while troops were still in the field.

"I would take this as evidence that the search for scapegoats with regard to the Iraq war has now been fully engaged by the military," Bacevich said.

"The officer corps doesn't want to get stuck with responsibility for a war that has already proven to be a disappointment and could result in failure. This is an indication that Rumsfeld has been selected as the military's preferred scapegoat," he said.

Richard Kohn, a military historian at the University of North Carolina who oversaw the work of H.R. McMaster of the controversial "Dereliction of Duty", acknowledges the point of the book--officers need to offer frank and strong criticism of civilian war plans when appropriate, but nevertheless points out that there is another side of that coin.

Nevertheless, Kohn, who has discussed relations with civilian leaders with several top officers, said he believed it might be dangerous for such recently retired generals to go public with such criticism.

"If they go out and attack the policy after leaving and they get personal about it, they're undermining civilian control," Kohn said.

Seems pretty personal to me.